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The importance of context and cognitive agency in developing police knowledge: going 
beyond the police science discourse 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues the current exposition of police knowledge through the discourses of 
police science and evidenced based policing (EBP) leads to exaggerated claims about what 
is, and can be, known in policing. This new orthodoxy underestimates the challenges of 
applying knowledge within culturally-mediated police practice. The paper draws upon 
virtue epistemology highlighting the role cognitive agency plays in establishing knowledge 
claims. We challenge the assumption that it is possible to derive what works in all instances 
of certain aspects of policing and suggest it would be more apt to speak about what worked 
within a specific police context.  
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Introduction 
The idea that knowledge can play an important role in shaping police practice has enjoyed much 
popularity in recent years. Whilst disagreements remain about the direction we should be taking, 
an emerging orthodoxy is being established within the police professional world through the 
language of evidenced based policing (EBP), with its underpinning ontological and 
epistemological assumptions (Bristow, Carter & Martin, 2015). It is important to stress at the outset 
that this paper should not be viewed as ‘anti-police science’ or against EBP. Indeed, EBP 
represents an acknowledgment of the importance of knowledge within policing that is arguably 
overdue (Weisburd and Neyroud, 2011; Sherman, 2011; Fyfe and Wilson, 2012). The degree to 
which epistemic authority is being established within policing through the police science discourse 
and the promotion of EBP is a welcomed development (Wood and Bryant, 2015). EBP is playing 
an important role in challenging the relative rigidity of the police hierarchy and the corresponding 
de facto authority linked to the rank structure. The increasing application of EBP methods are also 
undermining a traditional reticence towards academic research within practical policing circles. 
Further, EBP has helped to empower leaders within the police hierarchy over recent years in taking 
the idea of police knowledge forward and its importance has been articulated in various reports 
(Flanagan 2008; Neyroud 2011; Winsor 2012; IPC 2013). Indeed, establishing the College of 
Policing (CoP) as an independent professional policing body, which was a central component of 
the UK Coalition Government’s transformation of the policing architecture, would have been 
unlikely without the supporting police science discourse and promotion of EBP. Irrespective of 
what has, or has not, been achieved in practice following the introduction of the CoP, the idea that 
knowledge is important within policing has become widely accepted. We should not underestimate 
the significance of this development, nor the role played by EBP in bringing this about. 
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However, there is a concern that the advent of EBP has focused the police knowledge debate within 
rather narrow parameters of a police science discourse, which restricts knowledge claims to 
specific methods of enquiry (Bullock & Tilley, 2009; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015). In particular, 
the importance of the randomised control trial (RCT) has risen dramatically within the academic 
policing world in a way that appears to be diminishing the importance of other approaches to 
developing police knowledge (Bristow, et al 2015). Whilst this is not necessarily the intention of 
advocates of EBP (Sherman, 1998; Neyroud and Weisburd, 2014), we need to stress the extent to 
which the embedding of research into policing is still very much in its infancy. There is therefore 
a danger of research findings being understood and interpreted in rather narrow ways, especially 
given the highly pragmatic nature of policing and the pressures on police to be efficient, and/or 
effective. We argue that this is giving rise to the perception that EBP represents an orthodoxy 
within police research, which is consequently seen in terms of the discovery of statistically 
significant differences between control and intervention groups, with the intention of applying 
such findings from one specific instance more generally. Qualitative researchers are beginning to 
express feelings of being undervalued, as they well might do, alongside police historians and those 
favouring a normative approach to police research.  
 
Context is everything 
This paper seeks to question aspects of the police science discourse by highlighting two important 
factors that we argue have been given insufficient attention. The first of these factors is that 
policing, like other social interactions, is so context dependent, with a multitude of nuanced 
variables, that statistically based research will always need to be contextualised by the specifics of 
each policing circumstance (Greene, 2014; Heaton & Tong, 2016; Bristow, et al, 2015). This 
makes it difficult to justify claims with a high degree of certainty that a particular policing strategy 
worked in a particular context, if we are to understand ‘worked’ as the intended consequence of an 
activity; it makes it impossible to predict what works in every context. One RCT in isolation, like 
the proverbial lone swallow, can lead to exaggerated claims in the wrong hands. This is understood 
by advocates of EBP but this alone does not prevent the manipulation of research evidence within 
politically directed policy agendas. Moreover, the context varies so significantly over time and 
place, reflecting different social, economic, historical, cultural and political influences of both the 
past and present (Fyfe, 1992; Bottoms & Wiles, 1992). This makes it difficult to repeat RCTs in a 
manageable way against any constant, consistent criteria because of the ever changing and 
unpredictable nature of policing. Patrol policing operates in highly emotive circumstances, in 
which people are driven by rational, non-rational and irrational motivations (Waddington 1999). 
This also makes policing highly normative and what we see as working at one moment, might be 
deemed as failing in another. It might be possible to claim that a particular police policy worked 
in achieving a specific police objective, but if the policing objectives change, that particular policy 
is likely to become redundant.   
 
There is no knowledge without knowing agents 
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The second factor that we wish to highlight is that in establishing what constitutes police 
knowledge we need to be mindful of developments in the study of knowledge, and in particular 
the insights emerging from the literature on virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemology places 
greater emphasis on the role the ‘knower’ plays in establishing knowledge claims (Kotzee 2013). 
Indeed, from this perspective, there is no knowledge in the abstract; it is always contextualised and 
given meaning through cognitive agents (Pritchard, 2013). This is of particular importance in 
policing, given the extent to which police officers are integral players in terms of putting police 
knowledge into practice. Much of the police science discourse pays too little attention to this aspect 
of knowledge. Consequently, it gives the impression that knowledge is something definitive, 
uncontested and abstracted from those creating and applying it in particular circumstances. Given 
the highly pragmatic characteristics of professional policing, this police science discourse implies 
that knowledge is simply advanced through the application of scientific methodologies that can be 
operationalised through appropriate policy and practice (e.g. see Neyroud and Weisburd, 2014). It 
is our contention that the development of police knowledge relies as much on embedding critical 
reflection within police practice as it does generalising the results of a single RCT. Police 
knowledge cannot be gained in the abstract. For knowledge to be established we require ‘knowing 
agents’, and within the specifics of policing this requires ‘knowing police officers’, especially if 
we wish the knowledge to be embedded and applied within professional practice. Police 
practitioners become the architects of police knowledge, working in collaboration with academics 
as appropriate (Fyfe & Wilson, 2012), and more importantly, such knowledge creation needs to be 
contextualised and particularistic, as opposed to establishing the kind of universal application 
implied by some of the police science literature.      
 
The understanding of police knowledge we seek to develop in this paper emphasises context as an 
inevitable limitation to predictability. We therefore adopt an approach that requires us to provide 
meaningfully contextualised explanations regarding what did/didn’t work as opposed to definitive 
statements of fact regarding what works. The approach we favour forces us to think about 
developing police knowledge through informed police decision making, as opposed to evidence-
based policy. This understanding of police knowledge reasserts the centrality of police discretion 
as the embodiment of much professional police knowledge, and the means by which 
knowledgeable police practitioners engage in an ongoing, critically reflective practice.  
 
Knowledge, knowing and culture 
Research into policing is growing and there is also an increasing number of graduates in the police 
service (either at entry or gaining academic qualifications during service). These developments, 
alongside the creation of the College of Policing, demonstrate that police knowledge is no longer 
reliant exclusively on experience and ‘craft’, with no contribution from science. Instead, it is 
increasingly conceptualised as a combination of ‘art’, ‘craft’ and ‘science’ (Innes, 2010; Tong & 
Bowling, 2006; Tong, Horvath & Bryant 2009). We use the term science here in its broad sense to 
refer to a variety of perspectives and insights from academic research, and as such having an 
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important role to play in the development of research informed practitioners. However, as 
indicated in the introduction, this paper also articulates a concern that the discourse around police 
science is narrowing and becoming more focused around particular research agendas. This can 
lead to science being cast in opposition to art and craft based understandings of policing, which in 
turn can inadvertently reduce the likelihood of police practitioners becoming engaged with police 
science endeavours. We should not ignore Innes (2010: 32) when he points out that ‘what counts 
as effective policing is more ‘art’ or ‘craft’ than ‘science’’. We also need to take heed of the 
findings from Hallenberg & Cockcroft (2016), which demonstrates that organisational resistance 
to officers who graduated with in-service degrees and narrowly defined perspectives on what 
counts as evidence can hinder development of police knowledge and its application to practice. 
The effectiveness of attempts to develop police knowledge are much more reliant on having 
practitioners critically engaged with their work, with the ability to apply professional discretion, 
than we currently acknowledge. 
   
We say more below on what constitutes police knowledge, and the central importance of engaging 
police officers in the generation of this knowledge. At this point though, we wish to explore how 
knowledge generated through academia is received within policing. We suggest that any attempt 
to explore issues of ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’ in a police context inevitably requires an 
appreciation of the role that culture plays in shaping understanding of what might be broadly 
termed the police social world. This is for two key reasons. At the general level it is probably 
appropriate to suggest that culture influences or permeates, in some way, most elements of 
policing. This versatility of application in itself is probably an artefact of the broadness of the 
conceptual definition of police culture. At a deeper level, however, it is true to say that culture is 
built on, or from, knowledge. Indeed, Schein’s (2004) assertion that culture is manifest at three 
different levels (Artifact, Espoused Value and Basic Underlying Assumption) suggests that 
knowledge is instrumental in driving assumptions and the values that derive from them. More 
explicitly, Sackmann (1991) sees shared knowledge as fundamental to the collective cognition that 
constitutes culture. 
 
It should be noted from this that ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ raise cultural questions and issues 
above and beyond those of simply understanding the frameworks that determine shared 
assumptions and values in the police institution. Whilst ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ may be 
fundamental facets of the police occupational culture, the culture itself can help us to understand 
the ways in which ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ become culturally constructed to represent 
factionalised interests within the criminal justice communities. Indeed, the professionalisation 
agenda within the context of UK policing has increasingly led to policy debates regarding the 
nature of police ‘knowledge’. This is demonstrated by the growing influence of EBP as the prime 
articulation of what constitutes police knowledge in the UK today. At the same time, the 
professionalization agenda also establishes the best means by which to develop ‘knowing’. This 
can be seen, for example, in the College of Policing consultation on a Policing Education 
Qualifications Framework.  
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Reaching consensus over what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ is demanding. Defining the 
boundaries between culture and knowledge remains difficult, and clarity is further hindered 
through the inevitably politicised contexts, which provide the backdrop for such debates. The 
challenge here is to some degree a cultural one. To illustrate this, the paper will draw on two 
examples, taken from the literature on police culture, that highlight cultural divisions between what 
constitutes ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’. The first pertains to a cultural schism between policing 
and academia whilst the second shows that internal cultural divisions within police organisations 
also exist.  
 
 
Policing / academia relationships within the production of police knowledge 
The relationship between policing and academia has assumed different forms at different times. It 
is best thought of as a cluster of mutable relationships, rather than an unchanging singular 
relationship. There are also different motivations at play when the police service engages academia 
in the development of police knowledge. Innes (2010: 13), for example, draws a distinction 
between police research using the metaphors of a ‘motor’, where research is intended and/or 
interpreted for purposes of reform, development and improvement, or a ‘mirror’, where research 
is intended and/or interpreted to reflect the complex realities of extant policing practice. Innes 
(2010) also notes that the relationships between policing and academia can produce research by, 
on, for and with the police1.   
 
Knowledge has historically meant different things within the worlds of policing and academia. 
However, this is undoubtedly showing signs of change. Much progress has been made since the 
late 20th century, when Fielding (1988, p.24) described how one member of a police recruitment 
panel declared of university graduates that he, ‘...wouldn’t touch them with a disinfected barge 
pole’. At about the same period in history, Punch (2007, p.110) suggested that “to be educated was 
to be deviant” in the eyes of the police. It is in terms of the development of collaborative 
partnerships between police and academic institutions where this change in how knowledge is 
                                               
1 Innes (2010:14) observes that ‘ideas’ in policing tend to fall into one of two groups: 
 
First, there are those that have had a ‘wide and deep’ influence on the study of policing. 
Akin to axiomatic statements, these are fundamental truths that, although not always 
obvious, exhibit a persistent and ongoing influence, subtly configuring the perspectives 
and understandings developed in relation to a particular subject. The precise content of 
such ideas is frequently reconfigured and reworked across different contexts, but the ideas 
are significant because they provide cross-cutting intellectual scaffolding that extends 
across specific topics. Second, and in contrast, there is a greater number of more narrowly 
and locally influential ideas that are more domain-specific, moulding understanding of 
specific aspects of policing 
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perceived has been most visible. It can be argued, however, that, whilst there has been a genuine 
will to work collaboratively, the cultural values that underpin each erstwhile partner represent 
different ways of viewing the world. Canter (2004: p.4), for example, argued that ‘[p]erhaps the 
most fundamental distinction between the police and the academic communities is what they 
regard as knowledge’ and whilst he is referring specifically to scientific culture and its relationship 
to police investigation, parallels with academia and policing in more general terms are clear. This 
might be considered a fundamental issue and one that cannot be shielded by superficial synergies 
allowed by the emergence of the disciplines of criminology, criminal justice and policing studies 
whose titles suggest a joint enterprise between both sectors. This schism between the ‘police’ and 
the ‘academy’ is largely driven, according to Canter (2004), by factors pertaining to the importance 
of the law (and its application) to the police. This, in part, drives one of the key elements of the 
police view of knowledge which tends to portray it as inherently connected to ends rather than 
means. In this respect the concept of ‘evidence’ supplants that of ‘hypothesis’. The meaning 
constructed through information (for example, from analysing raw data) is established and 
evaluated through the binary as constituting evidence or not. The academic ideal establishes that 
data comes in shades of reliability and knowledge is derived through trial and error. To the police, 
there has been traditionally less appetite for evidence that comes with caveats or conditions, or for 
knowledge that needs a number of ‘test runs’ to prove its credentials. 
 
Of importance to Canter (2004, pp. 3-4), therefore, is the fact that, ‘fundamental differences in 
thought processes, typical modes of action and the central objectives that shape the institutions in 
which these cultures thrive’ lead to, and are informed by, essentially different paradigms of 
‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’. Whilst these specific paradigms undoubtedly hold utility for the 
respective partners, discrepancies between institutional paradigms only become visible as 
partnership and cross working practices develop as a response to organisational needs. 
 
In many ways there is a growing convergence between the spheres of policing and academia and 
a consequent narrowing of the cultural divide between both worlds. The importance of police 
knowledge has continued to be advanced within police institutions, and the police are becoming 
much more attuned to the subtleties and nuances of academic understandings of knowledge. 
However, policing by necessity remains highly pragmatic, and many police practitioners arguably 
lack the motivation, desire and indeed (for some at least) the experience to engage with the inherent 
difficulties of establishing knowledge or to operate within a world of complexity, as opposed to 
one in which things can be easily categorised.   
 
The narrowing of the cultural divide between academia and the police is also a consequence of the 
retreat within academia away from the nineteenth and twentieth century liberal ideals that gave 
shape to the modern university. Indeed, as McIntyre (2013, p.360) notes, the liberal university 
idealised by Cardinal Newman in the mid-nineteenth century was in part a response to criticisms 
of academia at that time. These criticisms included both the utilitarian dismissal of the education 
provided by Oxford and Cambridge as irrelevant ‘to the 19th Century socio-economic world’, and 
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the secularist calls at that time to have religion removed from the classroom. McIntyre (2013) 
presents this aspect of Newman’s idea of the university as evidence of an ongoing crisis in liberal 
education and the ideals characterised within academic culture. He notes at the same time the 
contemporary challenges to academia from ‘vocationalisation’ and ‘politicisation’ (McIntyre 
2013, p.360). Both vocationalisation, understood as the subordination of liberal educational values 
to ones that meet economic needs, and politicisation, which sees the role of education to be 
producing an idealised citizenry, represent a retreat away from academic values. They establish 
instrumental values as the driving force within universities, which in turn brings them much closer 
to the professional occupational worlds of institutions such as policing. The ‘ivory tower’ 
representation of the university is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Consequently, the 
cultural shaping of knowledge in universities falls more into line with those created in professional 
contexts, such as policing.    
  
Developing police knowledge within the contexts of police practice 
Police knowledge is not only shaped by the evolving relationships between academic and policing 
partners, but also by continuities and changes within police institutions. Culturally driven readings 
of ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’ do not create challenges just in terms of inter-institutional issues, 
but also in terms of discrepancies in what constitutes a shared understanding of knowledge (Fyfe, 
2013).  
 
Within the police culture literature, intra-institutional discrepancies have asserted themselves in 
the culturally driven divide between experiential knowledge and understanding acquired through 
more formal means. The following extract, taken from Van Maanen’s seminal 1978 piece 
‘Observations on the making of policemen’, amply illustrates this issue; 
 
Through the eyes of his experienced FTO [Field Training Officer], the recruit learns the 
ins and outs of the police role. Here he learns what kinds of behaviour are appropriate and 
expected of a patrolman within his social setting...This traditional feature of police work - 
patrolmen training patrolmen - ensures continuity from class to class of police officers 
regardless of the content of the academy instruction. In large measure, the flow of influence 
from one generation to another accounts for the remarkable stability of the pattern of police 
behavior (pp. 299-300) 
 
The tension between formal/legal knowledge and that derived from experience mirrors in part the 
ambiguities inherent in the police role, not least the application of legal rigidity to the vagaries of 
human nature. It is well documented that police practitioners experience challenges in knowing 
how to apply the law to the world in which they work (and, as LaFave (1962) noted, knowing how 
not to apply it). This application (or non-application) of law to reality also has potentially far-
reaching consequences. Indeed, Brogden (1982) described judicial function as being undermined 
by the use of police discretion.  
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Police discretion has often been characterised not as the embodiment of professional judgement, 
but rather as the negation of, or in opposition to, ‘professional’ policing. Such a characterisation 
posits legal knowledge as the formal basis upon which professionalism in policing is founded. 
Police discretion, on the other hand, is presented as an informal means of ‘getting the job done’ 
with little or no consideration of a professional ethos. So, on the one hand it is broadly 
acknowledged that ‘Police knowledge is contextual and subjective’ (Cope, 2004, p.202), and that 
such knowledge informs discretionary decision-making, but on the other hand the apparent 
‘informality’ of police discretion sits uncomfortably with public expectation of a disciplined, 
professional and equitable application of what should be the universality of law.  
 
Traditionally the legalistic approach to police professionalisation only served to highlight, rather 
than resolve, the issue at hand given the circular nature of the problem. The police, institutionally, 
are seen to be guided by goals that are in turn driven by legal precepts and concepts. Ostensibly, 
there is a sense of fit here. However, in reality, the legal and procedural aspects of police training, 
whilst providing a sense of obligation and purpose, fail to fully equip the police officer for the 
realities of policing. As Van Maanen notes, formal knowledge is unhelpful without the ‘learning 
of complacency’ (1978, p. 305), through which officers discover how, and how not, to apply their 
learning. Discretionary application of the law remains a fundamental and necessary policing skill, 
but it also remains an aspect of police work that is not easily accommodated within a policy driven 
approach to policing, which is increasingly perceived to be what is needed in order to reassure a 
more demanding public with ever greater democratic sensibilities (Wood, 2016).  
 
Within the contemporary debate about police professionalism, the application of science replaces 
the application of law as the corrective to the perceived pathology of police discretion. Whilst the 
limitations of understanding police knowledge as nothing more than the application of the law is 
well established (Marshall 1978; Lustgarten 1986; Walker 2000; Stenning, 2011), there continues 
to be a view that police discretion is an unreliable base upon which to build an understanding of 
police professionalism. Police discretion continues to be seen in problematic terms as an obstacle 
to professional police practice. The focus today, however, is on establishing evidence-based 
policies that demand complete adherence from police officers. This can be seen within the 
literature promoting EBP, the idea of police science, and even within the procedural justice 
literature. All favour strong policy directives over officer discretion, the latter seen as an obstacle 
to policy adherence in the same way as it was formally perceived as a distraction from applying 
the law. This is the contextual setting within which contemporary calls are made for the police to 
adhere to tenets of occupational professionalisation. Moreover, the focus today on science as the 
basis of police professionalism leads to what Punch (2007) identifies as the need to certificate 
accepted knowledge through higher education. The externality of academic credibility is seen to 
provide an aura of respectability and professionalisation to police work. Moreover, given the 
financial pressures on universities, and greater external demands placed upon them to be more 
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relevant and more responsive to professional needs, universities are more than willing to oblige in 
supporting this process. 
 
Taken together, these examples of inter- and intra- cultural difference show how ‘knowing’ and 
‘knowledge’, concepts that are inherently fraught with nuance, become even more complex when 
applied to a policing context. In terms of understanding how police organisations ‘relate’ to 
external partners it is evident that different occupational groups may have very different 
understandings of key definitions. Crucially, such distinctions need to be seen as driven by the 
core aims and processes of particular institutions and then supported by associated cultures. These 
distinctions might be narrowing, but nonetheless retain an important contextual setting.  Internally 
within the police institutions, divisions remain as to what constitutes ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’. 
The debate over whether police officers need a degree illustrates the extent to which knowledge 
remains contentious within policing (Foster, 1999; Fyfe, 2013). At the same time, these issues are 
of interest to the wider public, who may wish to see such policing founded upon formal rather than 
cultural knowledge, however difficult the former is to identify, qualify and deliver.  
 
EBP, police science and police knowledge 
So far we have argued that there is in general a strong symbiotic relationship between police culture 
and police knowledge. This relationship emphasises the importance of context in shaping police 
knowledge. However, within current debates around police professionalization in the UK the 
dominating interpretation of police knowledge is EBP, shaped by epistemological assumptions 
and a police science discourse favouring scientifically tested informed policy directives. In this 
part of the paper we begin to question the assumptions informing EBP and the police science 
discourse, in particular by challenging the language used to promote ideas of police knowledge. In 
contrast, we draw upon alternative approaches to knowledge and consider different ways in which 
police knowledge can be advanced through approaches that currently fall outside of what is 
considered acceptable. 
 
We noted at the outset the important contribution made by advocates of EBP to the police 
professionalization debate. There are nonetheless concerns with the way in which police 
knowledge is being presented within the EBP orthodoxy, and in particular, the degree to which 
epistemic authority in policing appears to be restricted to a specific articulation of police science. 
These concerns are acknowledged, and responded to, in Neyroud and Weisburd’s (2014) editorial 
piece, in which they defend and expand upon the idea of police science articulated in an earlier 
paper (Weisburd and Neyroud 2011). Their 2011 paper acknowledges significant advances in 
policing over the previous 20-year period and the role played by academics working alongside 
police in helping to make these advances happen. However, at the same time, they argue that there 
remains a ‘disconnect between science and policing’ (Weisburd and Neyroud, 2011, p.2). They 
seek to redress this disconnect in both the 2011 and 2014 papers, with an emphasis on the need for 
the police to own the science that guides and underpins progress in police practice.  
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Neyroud and Weisburd (2014, p.289) use the term ownership to mean, ‘the police should become 
one of the key players in police science’. Clearly, being one of the key players does not necessitate 
in itself ownership. At most, it should mean co-ownership alongside other key players, and Neyoud 
and Weisburd (2014) note this in their concluding remarks. Moreover, Neyroud and Weisburd 
(2014) are using ownership as a means to an end by using it to encourage the police to take more 
responsibility for developing and disseminating police knowledge than is currently the case. They 
see raising the question of ownership as a means of forcing the police to acknowledge, and be 
more committed to, ‘the scientific enterprise and its values’ (Neyroud and Weisburd 2014, p.290). 
They also see the potential here to revisit the relationships between policing and academia, with a 
need to ensure that police ‘become knowledgeable about science and its procedures’ (p.292).  
 
In one respect, we need to appreciate and acknowledge the extent to which Neyroud and Weisburd 
(2014) are addressing the kind of cultural issues we have referred to earlier in this paper. They are 
attempting to overcome cultural resistance from within both academic and police worlds. 
However, whilst sympathetic to much of what Neyroud and Weisburd (2014) intend here, the 
language they use is not always helpful. The term ‘ownership’, for example, implies a high degree 
of political control in determining what constitutes knowledge. Whilst this might reflect realities 
within academia in terms of who and what gets funded, there is a degree of acceptance of this in 
Neyroud and Weisburd’s (2014) presentation that diminishes the academic ideal of knowledge. 
This ideal is perhaps always compromised in practice, but it remains nonetheless as a guard against 
an overly politicised understanding of knowledge, and a reminder of the virtue of knowledge in 
and of itself.  In the already highly controlled context of policing, where Government has a clear 
political agenda in terms of establishing the parameters of ‘what works’, ownership of knowledge 
will inevitably be unnecessarily restrictive. This can be seen already by the extent to which the 
current debate about police knowledge in the UK is dominated by questions of methodological 
orthodoxy.  
 
Against method; in favour of cognitive agency 
If knowledge is to have the kind of liberating and transformational potential envisioned by 
Neyroud and Weisburd (2014) we might be better turning to Paul Feyerabend for inspiration rather 
than imposing in advance a rigid structure of ownership. Feyerabend’s (1975) Against Method is 
particularly relevant in the current climate of police research, which appears to have a rather 
unhealthy fixation on the pros and cons of RCTs. Feyerabend (1975) challenges what he sees ‘as 
the ‘myth’ of methodological monism’ (Kidd 2013, p.413) within the history of science, and his 
‘epistemic pluralism’ draws upon John Stuart Mill’s conclusions in On Liberty (Mill 1859) that 
human imperfection requires a modus vivendi, which needs to be recognised within the philosophy 
of science and philosophy of education (Kidd 2013, p.410). Feyerabend (1975) reasserts liberal 
ideals of knowledge, as opposed to what McIntrye (2013, p.345) sees as ‘servile’ notions of 
knowledge. As part of this endeavour, Feyerabend (2001; 2011) continues to challenge the 
privileging of science over other forms of knowing, and in particular, the extent to which science 
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as an institution may frustrate and restrict the educational development and potential of individuals 
(Kidd 2013, p.419).    
 
Similarly, the primary title of Neyroud and Weisburd’s (2014) paper, ‘Transforming the Police 
Through Science’, does little to convey the importance of agency in bringing about the change the 
authors desire. It appears to ignore significant developments within epistemology over recent 
decades. In particular, the emergence of virtue epistemology as ‘arguably the dominant viewpoint 
in contemporary epistemology’ (Pritchard 2013, p.236), has had a significant impact on how we 
think about knowledge claims. Most importantly, virtue epistemology asks, ‘not so much what 
knowledge is’ but rather ‘what it is to be a good knower’ (Kotzee 2013, p.157). The subject’s 
‘cognitive agency’ becomes the critical factor here (Pritchard 2013, p.237), which in turn adds a 
significant normative dimension to epistemological questions (MacAllister 2012). From the virtue 
epistemological perspective, it is meaningless to speak about police knowledge without placing 
the ‘intellectual qualities and habits’ centre stage (MacAllister 2012, p.253).  
 
Neyroud and Weisburd (2014, p.288) acknowledge that the conceptual presentation of science in 
their earlier paper ‘could be read as too restrictive’. Moreover, they have sought to redress this in 
their own writing and also by inviting critics to offer broader conceptions of science by drawing 
upon a wider range of academic disciplines and applying them to policing. However, science 
continues here to be abstracted out of context and it is not at all clear how it can be made real and 
tangible within police organisations. Even when Neyroud and Weisburd (2014, p.287) talk about 
‘the embedding of science in the education and training of police officers’, they seem to imply that 
‘science’ is an uncontested set of truths that simply need to be ingested by police officers. The 
latter are presented as passive recipients. There is little recognition of what police officers bring 
with them or how they develop knowledge through their practice. However, drawing upon the 
insights of a virtue epistemological perspective (MacAllister 2012; Kotzee 2013; Pritchard 2013), 
we suggest that if policing is to be transformed through knowledge, it is much more likely to occur 
if, and where, there is a sizeable majority of knowing police officers that is both knowledgeable, 
but also capable of critical thinking. A central component of police knowledge has to be the 
intellectual development of officers themselves. Pritchard (2013, p.236) offers a ‘continuum of 
cognitive agency’, which presents ‘understanding’ rather than “knowledge” as ‘the epistemic 
goal’. Wringe (2015, p.32) in a different but connected way supports ‘transformative’ learning 
over ‘an additive conception of education’. What both share is a commitment to developing the 
cognitive abilities of the subject as opposed to a view of education that simply implies the transfer 
of uncontested knowledge claims and skills.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Police knowledge is in a relatively strong position. Academic interest in policing continues to grow 
and this is reflected by the growing number of academic policing programmes in universities and 
the wealth of policing publications. There is also a greater recognition of the importance of 
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knowledge within policing and this is reflected in the increasing number of police officers engaged 
in research projects, whether through bodies such as the Society for Evidence Based Policing or 
as part of a formal study programme at a university. The CoP is also fostering working 
relationships between universities and police services, and has adopted a much more forceful 
approach to promoting the idea that a police officer’s authority is derived at least in part from his 
or her epistemic authority.  
 
However, despite these advances we feel that there remains a problem in how police knowledge is 
conceived, as something external, abstracted from the contexts within which it is situated. The 
debate about police knowledge is framed almost exclusively within a police science discourse that 
is unnecessarily restrictive and exclusionary. It not only excludes valid contributions to what 
constitutes police knowledge but it also favours a policy driven approach to embedding and 
applying police knowledge in a way that diminishes officer discretion. For us this fails to capture 
what is required. We need to be much more cognisant of developments in virtue epistemology to 
appreciate the extent to which knowledge is dependent upon the cognitive abilities of knowing 
agents. Within policing this means greater emphasis needs to be placed on the role officers can 
play in developing, embedding and applying police knowledge in practice. This demands knowing 
officers: ‘knowledgeable’ yes, but also with emotional intelligence and an acute sense of context. 
Whilst it is laudable to emphasise the need for police officers to apply logic and scientific 
principles and values, we should not lose sight of the situations that constitute police practice. 
Police officers routinely operate in highly emotive and emotional contexts that involve other 
human beings, who are often vulnerable and/or volatile. Police deal with people who are driven 
by rational, irrational and non-rational motivations (Waddington 1999) and police knowledge 
needs to recognise this. Police knowledge has to be much more than simply allocating the 
appropriate science to a specific policing problem as implied by Neyroud and Weisburd (2014). 
Above all else police officers need to be reflective practitioners for example, developing through 
practice and learning an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of intuition and mental 
heuristics as forms of reasoning. This demands that we see police discretion at the heart of debates 
concerning police knowledge.  
 
It would undoubtedly be much easier if we were able to establish policies that work in all policing 
instances. However, it is misleading for us to assume that this is possible. The problem is not 
simply that we will fall short of what are very high expectations. The problem is more profound 
and more damaging. The more we rely upon evidence-based policies to direct what we do in 
policing, the more we institutionalise a level of complacency and a failure to address the specifics 
of each and every police encounter. Rather than just establishing what works through research, 
with a view to developing and enacting policies, we also need to become more attuned to 
understanding what worked in a given context, with a view to developing the abilities of officers 
to read situations and apply their discretion if needed. Most importantly, we need to start thinking 
about police knowledge in terms of what is known by cognitive agents, rather than establishing 
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abstract notions. We need to see police knowledge as it is expressed through informed policing 
decision makers within the specifics of a given context, rather than only through evidence-based 
policies that claim sovereignty over all policing instances.      
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